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BOOK REVIEWS
that members whose monetary authorities, for the settlement of international transactions, in fact freely buy and sell gold within the limits
prescribed by the agreement shall be deemed to be fulfilling the provision requiring members to permit exchange transactions only at par
values, more or less the "official" rates of exchange. This presumption appears to constitute a quite logical exemption of countries, including the United States, which redeem their currency in gold internationally."0 Hence, it seems that the legality of the American transactions at other than the official rates of exchange cannot be doubted.
There are certainly situations in which a free-market rate may be not
only the genuine, butalso the proper rate of exchange.
In a subject as novel, and in many respects as unsettled, as the law
of money, these and other differences of opinion, whatever their justification, do not detract from the value of a book. It is Dr. Mann's
analysis, systematic presentation, and classification of the respective
problems, his profound knowledge and understanding of the same, both
in their national and international settings, the clarity of thought, and
accumulation of invaluable material, which give the work its great and
permanent value.
CHARLES EVANt

MONOPOLY IN AMERICA:

THE GOVERNMENT As PROMOTER.

By

Walter Adams and Horace M. Gray. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955. Pp. xv, 217. $4.00.
We often wonder how much good the Sherman Act accomplishes
but we can never hope to have very accurate information on the question. Obtaining it would probably require experimentation on a scale
which we cannot afford to risk. Instead, we put our faith in the proposition, for which there is at least some evidence, that such laws do inthrough appropriate measures consistent with this Agreement, to permit within its
territories exchange transactions between its currency and the currencies of other
members only within the limits prescribed under Section 3 of this Article." This is
followed by the second sentence discussed in the text above. As pointed out in note 24
supra, art. IV is not among the provisions stated to have full force and effect in this
country. See NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAW 532 (1950). He questions the internal,
as distinguished from the international, force of the provisions of the Fund Agreement
which were omitted.
36. NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAw 535 (1950); Nussbaum, The Legal Statuls
of Gold, 3 AM. J. Coiu,. L. 360, 361 n. 8 (1954). See also GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT
IN THE COURTS, INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS 316 n. 3 (1951).

'I Member, New York Bar and Faculty of New York University School of Law.
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fluence men's behavior in desired ways and we proceed to consider what
those ways ought to be. Uncertainty about the magnitude of the total
impact of antitrust law does not seriously discourage inquiry aimed at
making the antitrust laws as rational and workable a body of law as possible. Nor has it prevented reasonably energetic enforcement throughout much of the period since the Sherman Act was passed.
A more disabling set of doubts would emerge, conceivably, if we
were to think and learn enough about the other ways in which government influences the competitive character of our economic system. It
is at least possible that while the government as regulator has thrown its
weight mostly behind the forces making for competition, government in
other capacities has consciously or unconsciously been pushing from the
other side. But in a period when government operations constitute so
large a factor in the economy as they do today the discouraging possibility that government itself is constantly undermining whatever good
the antitrust laws accomplish should certainly be examined. Besides
exposing major contradictions in public policy such an examination
might point to more effective ways of achieving antitrust aims than
passing regulatory laws or might produce more searching thought about
what kind of economic system we wish to encourage. The suggestion
can be made, for example, that a society strongly committed to competition should use its tax structure to discourage the growth of big business. But, before intelligent consideration could be given to such a
suggestion, it would be necessary to know more about what effect our
present tax structure has on the competitive or monopolistic tendencies
of our system. Since all such questions involve the study of complex side
effects rather than the framing of a rational set of commands their
investigation seems to present even more formidable problems than those
of the antitrust laws themselves.
The present book points up both the importance of asking such
questions and the difficulty of furnishing satisfactory answers, although
the authors have a good deal of confidence about some of the answers.
The aim of the book is to call attention to a varied group of government
activities which in the authors' view tend strongly to promote monopoly
and thus work at cross purposes with the objectives avowed in the Sherman Act and related legislation. The areas selected for attention are
indicated by the chapter headings: Regulation and Public Utilities, Tax
and Expenditure Policies, Procurement for Defense, Disposal of Surplus
Property, Legislation and Atomic Energy. Within each area the book
reviews several episodes or facets of government policy which are thought
to illustrate either indifference toward the objectives of the antitrust
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laws or positive preference for big business and monopoly. (A major
flaw in the book is that the authors are quite undiscriminating in their
use of these latter two terms and seemingly unaware that they could
mean different things.)
Much of what the authors say gives plausible support for their
thesis that the federal government has been a strong "promoter of
monopoly" and of big business. In most instances, however, they seem
content to rest their case on data which do little but establish the need
for further inquiry. One example is procurement policy. There they
assume that figures showing the volume of defense contracts going to
"big" as compared with "small" businesses represent a fair index of the
extent to which procurement activities have promoted concentration and
monopoly. Another example is the percentage depletion allowance for
oil producers, which comes under heavy attack as a factor aiding big oil
companies rather than small ones. Here again, the statistical data seem
to be intended only to show that large oil companies have larger depletion allowances and larger tax benefits therefrom than small companies.
Moreover, after estimating the total "depletion subsidy" to the "major"
oil companies at $700-$750 million per year, the authors assert that "this
vast sum, year after year, has been diverted from the United States
Treasury .

.

.

into the treasuries of the major oil companies, from

whence it moves either into capital formation or into the hands of stockholders."' How they know that "this vast sum" has all turned up as
profit and has not gone into the pockets of consumers of oil products
is not explained. They would surely not argue that every cost reduction
results in an equal increase in profits or that all cost reductions which
affect large companies in greater dollar amounts than small companies
are causes of monopoly. Yet this seems to be the argument they ask
readers to accept with respect to tax deductions. These are merely random examples of the superficiality which pervades the book.
Throughout much of the book the level and tone of the discussion
seem more appropriate for political speech-making than for a book meant
to enlighten the general reader. This tendency seems especially striking in the chapter devoted to public utility regulation, where a tiresome
repetition of phrases like "abdication of sovereignty," "grants of special
privilege," "creation of vested interests," and "aggrandizement of private monopoly power" is used to try to persuade the reader that "the
experience of the past seventy-five years demonstrates that public regulation is a frail and hopelessly deficient instrument for protection of the
1. P. 83.
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public interest."' In their preface the authors state: "If we are guilty
of occasional overzealousness or extravagance in stating our case, we
hope the reader will be forbearing and forgiving." This is perhaps the
only understatement in the book. It would be easier to be indulgent
toward these confessed deficiencies of the book if the problems it raises
were less important. They deserve more sustained, intensive and disciplined study than this book reflects.
PHIL C. NEALI
2. P. 54.
t Professor of Law, Stanford University

